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Introduction 
One of the most pernicious legal fictions in criminal law is that people 
stopped by the police chose to be stopped and searched.  As a result of this 
legal fiction, most people stopped and searched by the police are denied 
their Fourth Amendment protections on the theory that they opted to 
abandon these rights.  Here is one example of how this fiction played out in 
an actual case. 
Mr. Thompson and Mr. Carter,1 poor black men who were walking in 
a poor neighborhood in Washington D.C. in 2011, were stopped by police.  
I use the term “stopped” advisedly, for police officers abruptly pulled their 
cruiser to the curb, got out, walked up to the two men and began to question  
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law.  To Andrew 
Taslitz who inspires me in many ways, including thinking about the connection between 
social science and the law, with thanks to Dean Kurt Schmoke of the Howard University 
School of Law for continued support of my scholarship.  A special thank you to Catherine 
Grosso and Dean Joan Howarth of the Michigan State University College of Law for 
inviting me to speak on this topic at their symposium and to those who attended for their 
interest and encouragement.  Kudos to Anitha Vemury for her fine research support. 
 1. Individual names are altered to ensure client privacy. 
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them.  The men stopped walking and answered the police.  The questions 
the police asked are routinely posed to pedestrians in inner-city 
neighborhoods throughout this country.  Here’s the trilogy: 
1. Where are you going? 
2. Do you have any drugs on you? 
3. You don’t mind if I search you just to be sure? 
People who comply with the officer’s request to search are asked to 
put their hands behind their head, fingers interlaced, legs three feet apart, 
while the officer methodically checks for drugs.  There is a divergence of 
opinion on what would happen to inner-city residents who refuse to comply 
with an officer’s request to search, but few actually take that risk.2  Neither 
Mr. Thompson nor Mr. Carter wanted to anger the officers. 
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, police 
need a valid reason to stop and question someone in a car.  That is because 
the Court has declared that a stop is a type of a seizure.  In order for police 
to pull over a car, they must have, at minimum, a reasonable basis for 
suspecting that the driver or a passenger has committed a crime or is about 
to commit a crime.  However, the rules change dramatically when the 
person targeted is standing or walking. 
What happened to Mr. Thompson and his friend is not even called a 
stop.  D.C. police call it a “contact,” as in:  “I went up and made contact 
with the individual.”  Contacts are consensual.  That means an individual 
chooses to have a conversation with the police officers, instead of walking 
away.  The usual Fourth Amendment constraints on police intrusions 
simply do not apply when courts determine that the stop was really a 
consensual encounter.  Under current Supreme Court case law, police may 
stop people standing or walking based on a hunch or without any reason 
whatsoever, as long as a trial court categorizes that stop as a consensual 
encounter.  The people most likely to walk—children leaving inner-city 
schools, people without cars, those who live in poor neighborhoods—are 
the people most likely to be targeted for “consent” searches.3  In the cases 
                                                                                                                 
 2. One study found that over ninety-five percent of people asked to consent to a 
search did so. See Janice Nadler & J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police 
Encounters 5, forthcoming in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LINGUISTICS AND LAW, [Hereinafter 
The Language of Consent] (Peter Tiersma & Lawrence Solan eds., 2012) (forthcoming July 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485008 (“One study found that over 95% of 
people asked to consent to a search did so.” (citing to State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632; 790 A.2d 
903 632)) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 3. See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants:  The 
Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 
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we see in the Howard University School of Law Criminal Justice Clinic, 
police often target individuals in poor neighborhoods based on their 
professional mission to make drug arrests and the indisputable logic that to 
find drugs each day, officers need to search many people.4  The consent 
doctrine serves the drug war by allowing police to stop, question, and 
search without any particularized suspicion that this person has contraband 
on them.  It also leaves a segment of our society without legal protections, 
encourages an ever-growing distrust of police, and sends a message that 
certain populations fall outside of the social fabric. 
Paradoxically, the test articulated by the Supreme Court to determine 
whether police have stopped—as opposed to contacted—an individual 
would seem to favor Mr. Thompson.  The Supreme Court test is whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to leave 
or to terminate the conversation, and individuals who are reasonable in 
feeling constrained from leaving have thus been “detained” under the 
Fourth Amendment.5  Acquiescence to authority is not consent.6  Logic  
                                                                                                                 
139 (2011) (noting that minorities are disproportionately singled out for “consensual” 
encounters, and that minorities are least likely to “feel free” to leave such encounters).  For a 
discussion of how the war on drugs has targeted the poor and black men and women of 
every class, see Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises:  The 
Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 586 (1991) (“The broad 
powers given to the police in that decision will be exercised in minority and low-income 
communities, and many of our citizens will be subjected to unscrupulous police conduct.”).  
See also David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
241, 241–42 (2001) (“Even though illegal drug use appears to be an equal opportunity 
offense, blacks and the poor are disproportionately arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for 
drug offenses.”). 
 4. David Rudovsky, Toward a Rational Drug Policy:  The Impact of the War on 
Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 237, 241 (1994) 
(describing the reasoning for large numbers of stops by police on streets and sidewalks).  
The article notes: 
Increasingly, enforcement on the street depends upon making large numbers 
of stops and searches without the kind of individualized justification 
normally required by the Fourth Amendment, on the theory that the 
abundance of drugs in our society will result in positive finds in a certain 
percentage of the stops. This net ensnares the innocent and guilty alike. 
While we only represent indigent clients, almost all persons charged with 
misdemeanors in the District of Columbia are assigned free attorneys 
because they are poor. 
Id. 
 5. See Lindsey v. United States, 911 A.2d 824, 833 (D.C. 2006) (“Thus, there is no 
reason to conclude that he perceived that he was in custody or that he was not free to leave if 
he wished, nor that any reasonable person in his position would have perceived that he was 
not free to leave.”); see also I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984) (holding that 
interviewing a suspect in a custodial setting for an unrelated reason is not a seizure within 
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suggests that Mr. Thompson would have wanted to keep walking and only 
stopped because he was acquiescing to the officers’ authority.  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has fleshed out the test with factual 
rulings that assume that people can always walk away from police officers 
who approach them, as long as the officers do not use words like “halt” or 
brandish a weapon or grab the person stopped.7  Police may target, stop, 
and question a pedestrian for any reason and not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if a court decides that a reasonable person in the pedestrian’s 
shoes would have felt free to leave.8  The Supreme Court has found no stop 
and therefore no type of detention or seizure in situations every bit as 
coercive as the one facing Mr. Thompson and his friend. 
When I told a class of students at Howard University School of Law 
that they can walk away when police officers approach to ask them 
questions, they rebelled.  “Not in my neighborhood,” said one student.  
“You can get yourself arrested,” another law student said.  “Or shot,” added 
another.  The law students were preparing to teach high school students 
their rights.  One student in my class who was a former police officer 
declared that it would be irresponsible for us to tell young people that they 
can walk away from police.  As the students recognized, the free-to-leave 
test, as applied by the Court, is unmoored from reality.  In reality, Mr. 
Thompson and his friend believed, with justification, that they could not 
walk away from the police without risking repercussions including an arrest 
for failing to obey a police officer.9 
                                                                                                                 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 6. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968) (“When a prosecutor 
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving 
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.  This burden cannot be discharged 
by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.”); see also Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) (holding that if police convey the impression that the 
request is a command, then consent is not voluntary). 
 7. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that “a person 
is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of 
movement is restrained” (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 
(1976))). 
 8. See id. (“We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”). 
 9. See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply:  
Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 1504 
(2007) (stating that failure to cooperate with a police officer’s directives can have many 
serious repercussions, including arrest and charges). 
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This area of law parallels judicial attitudes towards domestic violence 
victims.  Judges sometimes blame battered women for failing to leave 
abusive partners.10  Research shows, however, that women are in the best 
position to know whether they are in greater danger by leaving or staying.11  
Just as courts sometimes tell battered women to leave their abusers without 
really knowing how that might affect their safety, courts essentially tell Mr. 
Thompson that it is his own fault for failing to leave the encounter with the 
police, without really knowing how that might have affected his welfare.  
Whatever actual dangers lurked for Mr. Thompson at the time, the Court 
will later re-imagine the confrontation as a consensual encounter where Mr. 
Thompson implicitly expressed his wish to stop walking and engage the 
police. 
I teach a criminal justice clinic at Howard University School of Law 
where we represent poor clients charged with misdemeanors including drug 
possession.  Mr. Thompson was our client.  The police found illegal 
narcotics when they searched Mr. Thompson, which is why the case went to 
court. 
Mr. Thompson’s friend was searched, but he was allowed to leave 
when no controlled substances were recovered.  Mr. Carter’s stop and 
search is one of the thousands of searches where nothing is found and for 
which there is no record.12  This illustrates one reason why unlawful police 
intrusions are rarely rectified, even when there is case law on the side of the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Jane K. Stoever, Freedom From Violence:  Using The Stages of Change Model to 
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 Ohio St. L. J. 303, 336 (2011) (“Judges 
are preoccupied with this question and persist in asking it and variations, such as, “Why 
don't they just get up and leave?”); Heather Lauren Hughes, Contradictions, Open Secrets 
and Feminist Faith in Enlightenment, 13 Hastings Women’s L.J. (2002);  Naomi R. Cahn, 
Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2488 (1993). Moreover, there has been more 
scientific inquiry into the nature of coercion for domestic violence victims than for subjects 
of police stops. See, e.g., Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on 
Domestic Violence Victims:  How Much Is Too Much?, 22 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 2, 
22 n.73, (2007) citing to Alan Wetheimer, Coercion 206 (1987) (“coercion is contextually 
dependent, and has a significant subjective component, making the application of a universal 
standard of measurement difficult.”). 
 11. See Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, And Safety:  The Impact of 
Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 526 & n. 21 (2010); 
Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic 
Violence Law, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1107, 1127, n.93 & 94 (2009) (“research shows 
women are best able to determine the safest course of action” including research on 
separation assault) citing to Lenore E. A. Walker, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THERAPY:  
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 55 (1994). 
 12. See, e.g., Nadler & Trout, THE LANGUAGE OF CONSENT, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he 
vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.”).  
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pedestrian.  As David Rudovsky wrote, “[T]hose who are stopped and 
searched but found without drugs generally do not complain, and those who 
are found with drugs have little or no credibility in court to challenge the 
legality of the seizure and arrest.”13 
Scholars who have addressed the disconnect between the existing 
empirical evidence and the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence 
have focused on changing the nine justices’ minds.14  This Article focuses 
on influencing the trial court judge who decides the motion to suppress.  A 
novel way for defense lawyers to challenge the case law on consensual 
stops and searches is to present trial courts with social science data that 
proves that someone in Mr. Thompson’s situation would not feel free to 
leave.  While trial court judges must follow United States Supreme Court 
precedent, the Supreme Court has created a test that demands that judges 
consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a 
reasonable person would feel free to walk away in the face of police 
interrogation. 
Trial lawyers need not ask judges to jettison precedent when they cite 
social science that contradicts the Court’s prior analysis of cases before 
them.  Rather, social science data provides judges with important tools to 
apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test properly to the facts before 
them.  Consider how the law students in the Howard University clinic 
reacted to the notion that they are free to walk away from police officers 
who question them without inviting retaliation.  If citizens who are versed 
in the law are constrained by the officers’ power and authority, then it is 
unlikely that those without legal training could withstand the pressure of the 
badge.  A trial judge who knows that young people, or at least young people 
of color, would not feel free to leave should rule differently than a judge 
who is unaware of this reality. 
Social science research could be helpful here by outlining under what 
circumstances a citizen might feel free to refuse the request of a police 
officer.  One problem is that there is not a lot of social science data 
available.  As Janice Nadler writes, “[T]he extent to which citizens feel 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Rudovsky, supra note 4, at 241. 
 14. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout:  Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of 
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (2002) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should 
engage in an evaluation of the suspicionless search of civilians by law enforcement 
officials); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2035, 2040 (2011) (suggesting that the Court approach Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure with a “behavioral realist” approach). 
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compelled to accede to a police request is an empirical question,” although 
“[n]ot much empirical evidence is available to help answer that question.”15 
There is another problem to consider, namely that the free-to-leave 
doctrine is essentially a legal fiction.  The Supreme Court never really 
thought that someone stopped by police would feel free to leave.  This 
creates a particular challenge to lawyers because it raises the question of 
whether empirical data will sway a trial judge deciding a motion to 
suppress. 
In Part I, the facts in Mr. Thompson’s case are set forth to demonstrate 
why social science helps judges to properly adjudicate motions involving 
the “free-to-leave” test.  Part II examines how case law serves to block 
rational decision-making by trial judges when they determine the totality-
of-the-circumstances.  Part III explores the existing social science data 
relating to consensual stops.  Part IV investigates other scholarship, aimed 
at the Supreme Court justices, that addresses empirical data as a means to 
challenge Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  This section also discusses a 
recent case where the Court jettisoned an entrenched legal fiction.  And Part 
V will demonstrate that social science might make a difference at the trial 
level. 
Can social science challenge a legal fiction or are legal fictions 
immune from reality-based decision-making?  This article explores new 
territory in seeking to use empirical data to unmask the Supreme Court’s 
harmful decisions and to encourage trial judges to make independent 
assessments of whether the individual was detained or choosing to stop.  
This article will show that these assessments can be made even while 
scrupulously following the test set forth by the Supreme Court. 
I.  Testimony at the Motion to Suppress 
The Motion to Suppress in the case of Mr. Thompson was based on 
two distinct arguments.  First, we argued that the encounter was not 
consensual from the start since the police lacked even reasonable suspicion 
to believe Mr. Thompson had committed a crime.  Second, the search was 
impermissible because police lacked probable cause or consent. 
There were some “bad facts” to contend with when sculpting our 
search and seizure argument.  During the encounter with police, Mr. 
Thompson allegedly told the officer that he was just shooting up in an alley.  
                                                                                                                 
 15. Nadler & Trout, supra note 2, at 19. 
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When asked, “Do you have any drugs on you?” he helpfully responded, 
“Yes, in my top pocket.”  If the judge credited the officer’s testimony, this 
would provide probable cause for the search.  Thus, although we made two 
distinct arguments, we emphasized that the encounter violated Fourth 
Amendment rules the moment that Mr. Thompson was stopped by police.  
As soon as the police came up to our client and he stopped walking, he was 
seized, we argued.16  A person in this defendant’s shoes would not have felt 
free to walk away. 
During the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that he 
suspected the two men of holding heroin because he had found many 
middle-aged men with heroin in that neighborhood in recent weeks.  In 
addition, Mr. Thompson avoided eye contact with police as they drove up, 
which made the police want to investigate. 
The government wanted it both ways.  The prosecutor argued that Mr. 
Thompson did not want to interact with the police, giving rise to a reason 
for the police to investigate him.  Yet, at the same time, the prosecutor 
argued that Mr. Thompson freely chose to stop and answer questions, so 
apparently he did want to interact with police.  This incongruity epitomizes 
the fictional nature of the free-to-leave test. 
Although the police offered a reason for stopping our client to question 
him, these suspicions did not rise to the level of articulable reasonable 
suspicion, let alone probable cause.17  Therefore, the judge would have to 
suppress the evidence seized if she determined that the police stopped Mr. 
Thompson when they came up to him and started asking questions. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 621 (1991) (holding that seizure of a 
person requires physical restraint of the suspect or submission to that officer’s authority).  
The majority stated: 
To constitute a seizure of the person, just as to constitute an arrest—the 
quintessential ‘seizure of the person’ under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence — there must be either the application of physical force, 
however slight, or, where that is absent, submission to an officer’s ‘show of 
authority’ to restrain the subject’s liberty. 
Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Cauthen v. United States, 592 A.2d 1021, 1025 (D.C. 1991) (holding that 
police did not have reasonable, particularized, and objective basis when they seized and 
searched the appellant and his bag).  The court stated: 
For flight to suggest consciousness of guilt—a mentality other than a 
legitimate desire to avoid the police—that flight not only must be very 
clearly in response to a show of authority but also must be carried out at 
such a rate of speed, or in such an erratic or evasive manner that a guilty 
conscience is the most reasonable explanation. 
Id. 
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The hearing included an interchange that has become a stock phrase in 
motions to suppress.  On direct examination, the prosecutor asked the 
officer to describe the tone of voice he had used when the officer asked Mr. 
Thompson if he had drugs.  “Real conversational, just like I am talking to 
you today,” answered the witness.  Litanies of this sort have become a 
standard part of motions to suppress when the prosecution seeks to 
demonstrate a consent to stop or consent to search.  It bows to the case 
law’s reliance on what Edwin Butterfoss calls “‘minute factual differences’ 
that courts have determined to be crucial, but which bear little relationship 
to the individual’s actual freedom to walk away.”18  This attention to mostly 
irrelevant detail that is, from the point of view of the person obeying the 
officer’s instructions and most likely long forgotten by the officers 
themselves, gives these hearings “an air of unreality,” and reminds the trial 
judge that the case law is almost uniformly against any defendant who 
argues that he was only acquiescing to authority, not voluntarily 
consenting.19 
“Do you have any drugs or weapons on you?”  “There’s a dime bag in 
my right front pocket,” Mr. Thompson allegedly responded.  Later in his 
testimony, the officer added that he asked Mr. Thompson if he could search 
him and Mr. Thompson said, “Yes.” 
During cross-examination, the officer agreed that before the police 
searched Mr. Thompson, he told him to interlock his fingers behind his 
head and stand with his feet a couple of feet apart.  This position hardly 
conforms to the notion of a consensual search and probably influenced the 
judge’s perception of the encounter.  Fortunately for Mr. Thompson, the 
officer remembered very little about the encounter other than the four lines 
written in the police report.  He did not even recognize the Google map of 
the location where the men were stopped.  The other officer added little to 
the scenario.  Our client did not testify, a common occurrence in criminal 
cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures:  The Need for Clarity in Determining 
When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439–40 
(1998).  This litany over the officer’s tone of voice began after the case of United States v. 
Drayton where Justice Kennedy declared that passengers were not seized when police 
boarded their bus and requested cooperation with drug interdiction, in part because the 
officers “did not brandish their badges in an authoritative manner, did not make a general 
announcement to the entire bus, and did not address anyone in a menacing tone of voice.”  
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002).  But, Justice Souter took a different tack 
in his dissent, noting that a “police officer who is certain to get his way has no need to 
shout.”  Id. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 19. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting).   
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While it may seem obvious that Mr. Thompson and Mr. Carter did not 
want the police to stop them or question them, case law has a way of 
interfering with common sense interpretation of the facts. 
II.  How Case Law Blames the Victims of Unwanted Police Interactions 
The idea that some police interactions fall outside of the ambit of 
Fourth Amendment protection originated in Terry v. Ohio.20  In dicta, 
Justice Warren announced that “not all personal intercourse between 
policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.  Only when the 
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has 
occurred.”21  While agreeing with the dissent’s assertion that police 
interactions were sometimes used to harass individuals based on race, the 
majority carved out a category of police activity that would fall outside of 
judicial review, explaining that the Court was powerless to prevent 
harassment.22 
More than a decade later, United States v. Mendenhall articulated the 
free-to-leave test to separate out stops from consensual encounters, namely 
that “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”23  As one critic of the test observed, “literal application of the 
Mendenhall . . . ‘free-to-leave’ test would result in virtually all police-
citizen encounters being characterized as seizures.”24  The test “is ironic 
because it is generally accepted that, in fact, citizens almost never feel free 
to end an encounter initiated by a police officer and walk away.”25  From its 
inception in Mendenhall, the free-to-leave test was a legal fiction crafted in 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“There is nothing in 
the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the 
streets.”); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968). 
 21. Id. at 19 n.16. 
 22. See id. at 13 (“It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate 
police investigative techniques on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar 
involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections.”). 
 23. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that search and 
seizure is acceptable when the appellant has voluntarily consented to the search of her 
person). 
 24. Butterfoss, supra note 18, at 439. 
 25. Id.  
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order to permit some police seizures to fall outside the Fourth Amendment, 
and therefore to allow police some latitude to stop and detain without 
cause.26 
In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart wrote for the majority, although only 
one other justice joined him when he announced the free-to-leave test and 
concluded that Ms. Mendenhall had not been seized when she was accosted 
by Drug Enforcement Administration agents in an airport.27  In Mendenhall, 
DEA agents approached a 22-year-old black woman at an airport, asked for 
her ticket and driver’s license and then asked her to accompany them to an 
office where she eventually was strip-searched.28  The majority concluded 
that the search was constitutional since she had consented to a body search 
carried out by a female police officer who informed her that this would 
require Ms. Mendenhall to undress.29  Although most of the justices 
determined that Ms. Mendenhall had been seized or assumed this to be true, 
Justice Stewart and the Chief Justice found no seizure and concluded that 
the DEA agents did not even need reasonable suspicion to approach Ms. 
Mendenhall, examine her ticket, and ask her to accompany them to an 
office since she was allegedly free-to-leave at any time.30  As Tracey 
Maclin observed: 
In the unrealistic world of Mendenhall, the average citizen feels free to 
ignore a police officer who has approached her. In this abstract world, it 
is irrelevant whether the citizen is aware of her right to ignore the 
officer. In the real world, however, few people are aware of their fourth 
amendment rights, many individuals are fearful of the police, and police 
officers know how to exploit this fear.31 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See id. at 554 (“Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen 
and the police as a seizure . . . would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide 
variety of legitimate law enforcement practices . . . the acknowledged need for police 
questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws. ‘Without such 
investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty 
might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security 
of all would be diminished.’”). 
 27. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55 (Section IIA of Justice Stewart’s opinion, joined 
only by Justice Rehnquist). 
 28. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547–49. 
 29. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558–59.  This is section IIC of Justice Stewart’s opinion, 
with which the concurring justices agree. 
 30. Id. at 551–57.  This is section IIA of Justice Stewart’s opinion, which was joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist.  The concurrence did not join this section but concluded, 
instead, that Ms. Mendenhall was seized but that the agents had the requisite reasonable 
suspicion.  Id. at 560. 
 31. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion:  The Fourth Amendment 
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Or, as another scholar bluntly put it:  “How much of an idiot—how 
stupid, moronic, imbecilic—would a person carrying a gram of crack 
cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really 
consent—‘freely and voluntarily’—to being searched by a police 
officer . . . ?”32 
Another sign of the fictional nature of Justice Stewart’s decision was 
that at the time that a reasonable person in Mendenhall’s position would 
have felt herself free to leave, in fact, Ms. Mendenhall was not actually free 
to do so.  In his dissent, Justice White pointed out that the DEA agent 
testified he would have detained her if she had attempted to leave.33  Thus, 
in the “unrealistic world of Mendenhall,” people think they can walk away 
from police questions, even when, in reality they are not at liberty to do so. 
Mendenhall created a legal fiction by ignoring the officer’s subjective 
intentions, “constructing a highly artificial ‘reasonable person,’”34 and 
basing the determination on irrelevant details such as the number of police 
officers, “the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of 
the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”35  The 
legacy of Justice Stewart’s opinion in Mendenhall is that lower court judges 
“minimize important contextual features, like the fact that the speaker is 
armed,”36 while ascribing too much weight to the form of the question, and 
basing decision “on ‘minute factual differences’ that courts have 
determined to be crucial, but which bear little relationship to the 
individual’s actual freedom to walk away.”37 
                                                                                                                 
on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, at 1300 (1990). 
 32. John M. Burkhoff, Search Me?  Citizen Ignorance, Police Deception, and the 
Constitution:  A Symposium, Consent Searches by Ignorant Citizens, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1109, 1114 (2007).  See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 31, at 1300 (“How can the Court say that a 
reasonable person would feel free to leave an armed police officer in these circumstances?”); 
Alexandra Coulter, Drug Couriers and the Fourth Amendment:  Vanishing Privacy Rights 
for Commercial Passengers, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1331 (1990) (“The assertion that most 
persons in Mendenhall’s situation should feel free to leave absent a display of force rings 
hollow.”); Butterfoss, supra note 18, at 450 n.83 (“Most commentators believe citizens 
never feel free to leave when approached and questioned by a police officer.”). 
 33. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 575 n.12 (1980) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 34. Butterfoss, supra note 18, at 439–40. 
 35. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 36. Nadler & Trout, supra note 2, at 13. 
 37. Butterfoss, supra note 18, at 439–40. 
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 Again, in INS v. Delgado,38 the Court applied the free-to-leave test in 
a way that exposed the fictional nature of the Court’s reasonable person.39  
DEA agents blocked the exits of a factory and questioned employees, 
including Mr. Delgado, about their citizenship.40  Concluding there was no 
seizure, the Court explained that “police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to 
result in a Fourth Amendment violation.”41  Writing for himself and Justice 
Marshall, Justice Brennan complained about the “studied air of unreality” 
in the Court’s “proposition that the interrogations of respondents by the INS 
were merely brief, ‘consensual encounters.’”42  “Indeed, it is only through a 
considerable feat of legerdemain that the Court is able to arrive at the 
conclusion that the respondents were not seized.”43  After Delgado, it 
appeared that outside of a car or house, nothing short of physical touching 
or egregious police behavior would constitute a seizure. 
Florida v. Bostick44 changed the language of the Mendenhall test 
slightly, expanding it to fit drug interdictions that occur on buses and other 
cramped spaces where a person may not be able to physically leave.45  The 
defendant in Bostick was a bus passenger.46  During a brief stopover, police 
boarded the bus, approached Mr. Bostick, and stood over him, asking for 
his ticket and identification.47  After providing his documents to police, Mr. 
Bostick then assented to a search of his bag, but the lower court held that 
his consent was invalid because the initial stop was unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion.48  Reversing the lower courts, the Court found there 
                                                                                                                 
 38. I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 220–21 (1984) (finding that INS agents’ inquiry 
into factory workers’ citizenship while other agents are stationed at exits is not a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 39. See id. at 218 (“Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about 
has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the 
workers’ voluntary obligations to their employers.”).  The opinion goes further to state that 
“[t]he obvious purpose of the agents’ presence at the factory doors was to insure that all 
persons in the factories were questioned.”  Id. 
 40. Id. at 212–13. 
 41. Id. at 216. 
 42. Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439–40 (1991) (ruling that random bus 
searches that are conducted pursuant to the passenger’s consent are not per se 
unconstitutional). 
 45. See id. at 435–37 (explaining why the Mendenhall test needed to be changed). 
 46.  See id. at 431 (describing the defendant in Bostick). 
 47. See id. (outlining the initial interaction between the police and the suspect). 
 48. See id. at 432 (noting that the suspect did consent to the search). 
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was no need for reasonable suspicion if there was no seizure.49  Justice 
O’Connor wrote that the proper test was “whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.”50  The Court encouraged the lower court to find that the whole 
encounter was consensual unless the police behaved in an unusually 
coercive manner.51  “As we have explained, no seizure occurs when police 
ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the individual’s 
identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage—so long as 
the officers do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 
required.”52 Thus, even if a reasonable person in Bostick’s position would 
not feel free to exit the bus, the judge could still deem it a voluntary 
contact.53 
In addition, Bostick changed the reasonable person test to the 
reasonable “innocent” person test.54  One of Bostick’s arguments was that 
since there were illegal narcotics in his bag, he obviously would not have 
consented to a seizure of his person or a search of his bag if he had a 
choice.55  Therefore, police must have “convey[ed] a message that 
compliance with their requests [was] required,” which would make this 
encounter a seizure and make the search involuntary.56  Justice O’Connor 
dismissed that argument, explaining that “the ‘reasonable person’ test 
presupposes an innocent person.”57  Although the reasonable person test 
was always an objective test, Justice O’Connor took the fictional nature of 
this construct one step further away from reality.  The test now intentionally 
excludes the viewpoint of the person bringing the motion to suppress as 
police and prosecutors assert that they are not innocent people. 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See id. at 434 (stating the ruling of the case—since there was no seizure, the police 
did not need reasonable suspicion to perform the search). 
 50. Id. at 430. 
 51. See id. at 438 (explaining the high threshold the Supreme Court has used when 
reviewing a search and seizure case). 
 52. Id. at 435.  On the other hand, later case law allows police to charge individuals 
for refusing to hand over identification when asked. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District 
Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).  Contra Hiibel v. Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 177 (2004) 
(holding that police may charge an individual if the individual refuses to present 
identification when asked). 
 53. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 430 (1991). 
 54. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 55. See id. at 437–38 (arguing that a guilty suspect would not willingly consent to a 
police search). 
 56. Id. at 435. 
 57. Id. at 438. 
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Finally, in United States v. Drayton,58 the Supreme Court applied the 
facts to a situation quite similar to the one in Bostick.  Police boarded a bus 
and told passengers that they were conducting a drug interdiction and asked 
if they had bags on the bus.59  In determining that Mr. Drayton would feel 
free to terminate the encounter with police at any time, the Court brushed 
aside the fact that Drayton’s traveling companion, Brown, was arrested 
after submitting to a search that turned up drugs before Drayton also 
submitted to a search of his person.60  “If anything,” the Court opined, 
“Brown’s arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the consequences of 
continuing the encounter by answering the officers’ questions.  Even after 
arresting Brown, Lang [the police officer] addressed Drayton in a polite 
manner.”61 
In Blaming the Victim:  Consent within the Fourth Amendment and 
Rape Law, I suggested that the Drayton Court essentially blamed the victim 
of unwanted searches similarly to how society blamed rape victims for not 
fighting off aggressive men.62  “Just as rape victims were told they asked 
for it by wearing short dresses and not screaming for help, individuals are 
told they asked for it by extending their arms to be searched.”63  Justice 
Alito recently made explicit what had been implicit, blaming individuals 
who fail to exercise their rights properly.64  In Kentucky v. King,65 the Court 
held that police acted properly when they chose to try to gain entry into a 
dwelling through consent rather than applying for a warrant, and then used 
the sounds emanating from the apartment as a justification for breaking 
down the door.  “Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional 
rights” stated Justice Alito, writing for the majority, “have only themselves 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (finding that a police officer’s 
act of boarding a bus and questioning passengers did not constitute a seizure of passengers 
by police). 
 59. See id. at 197–98 (stating the initial interaction between the police and the 
suspect). 
 60. Id. at 199. 
 61. Id. at 206. 
 62. Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim:  Consent Within the Fourth Amendment and 
Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 1 (explaining how the history of rape law 
can illuminate the Fourth Amendment’s doctrine of consent). 
 63. Id. at 2. 
 64. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1849 (2011). 
 65. Id. at 1863 (holding that police can create their own exigency by knocking on a 
door without a warrant and then forcing entrance when they fear illegal drugs are being 
destroyed in response to the police knock).  See also id. at 1857–58 (stating that noise from 
within an apartment justified a warrantless search based on exigency when police reasonably 
concluded that drug-related evidence was being destroyed). 
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to blame for the warrantless . . . search that may ensue.”66  Thus, under 
Supreme Court precedent, it was Mr. Thompson’s fault for stopping when 
the police cruiser abruptly stopped a few feet from him and police came up 
to talk to him.  It was Mr. Thompson’s fault for not telling the police officer 
he wanted to be left alone.  In Justice Alito’s words, he had no one to blame 
but himself for not fighting back against the unwanted intrusion.67 
These cases make it difficult for a judge to truly evaluate whether the 
person before them was in a position to ignore the police officer or to tell 
the officer to leave him alone.  In order to apply the Supreme Court’s test 
accurately, judges would have to jettison the factual determinations made 
by the Court in Mendenhall and other consent cases where the Court went 
on to apply the facts to the articulated legal test.68  As critics of the Supreme 
Court consent doctrine have noted, “‘[T]he Court has never struck down a 
consent as involuntary.’  Never!”69  A trial judge is likely to compare the 
facts to one of these other cases, such as Mendenhall, and determine that 
the stop was consensual because the police were no more coercive in their 
behavior in the current case than in Mendenhall or Drayton.  This would 
turn the free-to-leave test into an “approved level of coercion without any 
indicia of suspicion needed” test.  Under an “approved level of coercion” 
test, police are allowed to detain people without cause as long as the 
coercion is subtle. 
The motion to suppress appeared bleak for Mr. Thompson.  Since the 
police testified that they behaved politely, the “approved level of coercion” 
approach would permit the police to stop and detain Mr. Thompson without 
needing a legitimate cause to do so.  Social science presented the 
opportunity for the judge to avoid the contradiction created by case law 
between the test as articulated and the test as applied. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (emphasis added) (describing that when 
police knocked on dwelling house seeking consensual entry, the occupants refused to open 
up the door, so the police broke down the door).  This activity was legal because police had 
probable cause to believe that the occupants were destroying marijuana and the police were 
permitted to create their own exigency thereby avoiding the need for a warrant.  The Court 
implied that the occupants could have won their motion if they stayed still after advising the 
police they were not welcome.  
 67. See id. at 1862 (stating that a citizen has the duty to refuse to give his or her 
consent to a police search). 
 68. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting that a 
defendant’s level of education and race were relevant but not decisive factors in determining 
whether the defendant voluntarily accompanied officers from airport concourse to Drug 
Enforcement Administration office). 
 69. Burkoff, supra note 32, at 1129 (quoting Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable 
Policeman:  Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 76 MISS. L. J. 339, 340 (2006)). 
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III.  Social Science Regarding Police Encounters 
Recently, I suggested to students that they include social science 
references in their motions to suppress.  I suggested this because this 
research would provide judges a basis and a background to persuade them 
to truly apply the free-to-leave test based on the circumstances in the 
current case, rather than relying on the Supreme Court’s previous factual 
determinations.  Social science might convince a judge to take into account 
what case law has obfuscated, namely, that these investigatory stops in the 
inner-city streets are coercive.  Also, the social science references might 
focus a judge’s attention on the particular individual stopped, or at least 
make the judge focus on how someone in the defendant’s position would 
experience the encounter. 
Although the free-to-leave test is supposed to be objective and from 
the point of view of someone in the defendant’s position, Supreme Court 
cases focus instead on police behavior.  Consent cases require case-by-case 
factual inquiries based on the totality of the circumstances, although trial 
judges tend to employ a legalistic approach comparing police actions in the 
case in front of them to prior case law.  Trial judges frequently reason that 
“the coercion by the police here was no greater than in Mendenhall, hence 
this was consensual.”  Since the consent in both Mendenhall and Delgado 
were legal fictions, it makes it difficult for judges to apply the purported 
Supreme Court test, and truly inquire into whether Mr. Thompson and 
individuals in his position would have felt free to ignore the police officer 
and “keep going about their business.”  Social science might encourage 
judges to apply the test honestly, thereby reaching a different conclusion 
than the Supreme Court did when it created a fictional “innocent reasonable 
person.” 
There is surprisingly little social science that investigates consensual 
stops and consensual searches and few law review articles that discuss the 
existing work.  The leading law review article is by Janice Nadler, No Need 
to Shout:  Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion.70  Nadler uses 
social science to critique the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. 
Drayton, arguing that the Supreme Court ignores the social psychology of 
compliance, conformity, social influence, and politeness in reaching its 
conclusions.71 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Nadler, supra note 14, at 155 (critiquing the standard applied by many courts 
to determine whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse a police officer’s request 
to be searched). 
 71. See id. (arguing that the question of whether a citizen feels free to terminate a 
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Studies show that people tend to underestimate the strength of 
situational constraints and overestimate the voluntariness of others 
actions.72  While people recognize how situational forces apply to their own 
past behavior, people are poor predictors of how they will act in a new 
situation.73  For example, one study asked participants to predict what they 
would do in a job interview when asked certain inappropriate questions and 
compared this data to job candidates who were asked the same questions.74  
Participants stated they would decline to answer the questions and confront 
the interviewer.75  In contrast most of the job candidates, faced with this 
choice in a simulated situation, in fact, capitulated.76  This literature might 
convince trial judges to recognize their own tendency to overestimate the 
voluntariness of defendants’ conduct in remaining at the scene to respond to 
police questions. 
Social science also serves to debunk the linguistic criteria fashioned by 
the Court to justify its conclusion that a suspect would have felt free to 
leave, so the police need not have a reasonable suspicion for the stop.  
Similarly, studies can refute the criteria fashioned to justify searches.  For 
example, the Court determined that the question “do you mind if I check 
[your bag]” if uttered in a quiet tone of voice would be understood as a 
request that could be refused without negative consequences.77 
In reality, listeners interpret questions or suggestions as orders when 
they come from a person of authority.  Employees do not distinguish 
                                                                                                                 
police encounter depends on certain empirical claims). 
 72. See id. at 168–69 (stating that people tend to grossly overestimate when the actions 
of others are voluntary). 
 73. See id. at 170–72 (stating that the general finding that observers do not appreciate 
the strength of situational constraints on one’s behavior has been demonstrated in many 
different settings, including encounters between police and citizens). 
 74. See id. at 171 (comparing answers in a survey focused on inappropriate answers in 
job interviews with actual answers in job interviews). 
 75. See id. at 172 (describing how participants in the survey answered that they would 
confront the interviewer directly). 
 76. See id. at 183 (describing an experiment by Solomon Asch where seventy-five 
percent of the participants gave a wrong answer in response to peer pressure, while most 
other study participants predicted they would not change their answer); see also John A. 
Bargh, Automaticity in Social Psychology, reprinted in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:  HANDBOOK OF 
BASIC PRINCIPLES 69, 179 (1996) (explaining the history, basics, and anticipated direction of 
automaticity research in the field of social psychology). 
 77. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199 (2002) (holding that plainclothes 
police officers did not seize bus passengers when they boarded a bus at a rest stop and began 
asking passengers questions, and also ruling that Mr. Drayton’s consent to the search of his 
person was voluntary). 
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between a boss informing them “don’t be late again” or using the softer 
approach:  “try not to be late again.”78  The soft request will be interpreted 
as an order because the authority-subordinate roles create the context for 
interpretation.79  There is little doubt that police are in a position of 
authority vis-à-vis someone they approach on the street.  Thus, the indirect 
request “would you mind if I searched your bag” coming from a police 
officer will therefore be interpreted by the suspect as “I am an officer; 
please do what you are asked and everything will go smoothly.”  Similarly, 
when police ask a driver, “Can I please see your license and registration,” 
the driver will interpret this as a command.80  In fact, this question is 
recognized by the Court as a command; drivers must give police their 
license and registration when pulled over.81   
Police may use the polite form when asking to see a driver’s 
documents because it constitutes face-saving language while 
communicating the same message as if the officer used a declarative 
sentence structure.82  “When discourse is framed as a suggestion (rather 
than imperative), and when the listener believes that he or she must comply 
anyway (due to the authority of the speaker), the suggestion is taken as a 
sign that the authority is being sensitive to face.”83  Thus, the line between 
requests and orders is essentially non-existent when it comes to a police 
officer requesting something from a suspect.  As Dorothy Kagehiro has 
pointed out, “‘I wouldn’t do that if I were you’ could be a warning or a 
threat,” depending upon the context in which it was uttered.84  Thus, judges 
should recognize that Mr. Thompson would have heard a command, even if 
police phrased the order as a request. 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Nadler, supra note 14, at 189. 
 79. See id. (discussing how tone can be irrelevant when an employer speaks to a 
subordinate employee). 
 80. Nadler, supra note 14, at 188. 
 81. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 261–63 (1973) (driver arrested when 
he could not produce his license after he was pulled over for crossing the center lane of a 
highway); see also David A. Harris, Car Wars:  The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the 
Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 568 (1998) (stating that either a driver or a passenger 
of a stopped motor vehicle who ignores a police request to exit the car may face the penalty 
of arrest for disobeying an officer). 
 82. See Nadler, supra note 14, at 189 (noting that a police officer’s polite tone does 
not necessarily change how a citizen interprets the statement). 
 83. Id. (“Because a police officer is perceived as an authority, he need not rely on 
coercive statements to achieve a goal—his role is adequate, and a polite request can increase 
face-sensitivity without reducing coercive power.”). 
 84. Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police 
Searches, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41 (2006). 
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As my students and I prepared for the motion to suppress, I decided to 
demonstrate what they were about to argue to the court.  I asked one student 
if he would like to redo the cross-examination of the officer and give it to 
me later that day.  His face fell; he looked devastated.  “Did you interpret 
my request as an order?” I asked in a surprised voice, explaining that I was 
just demonstrating Nadler’s point.  “Now that my heart stopped pounding,” 
the student replied, “I would have to agree that your experiment worked.” 
Nadler also cites literature to support the claim that allowing police to 
search might be based upon “over-learned patterns of responses” where 
individuals comply because the authority-subordinate roles dictate that 
response.85  It is often difficult to separate out role-oriented acquiescence to 
authority from acquiescence based on fear of disobeying police.  Legally, 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to view role response as creating a coercive 
situation because the police did not create this pressure.  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court criticized the state court in Drayton for finding that when in 
“cramped confines onboard a bus the act of questioning would deprive a 
person of his or her freedom of movement” because “this is the natural 
result of choosing to take the bus; it says nothing about whether the police 
conduct is coercive.”86  Physical proximity between officer and subject may 
also affect the voluntariness of the subject’s consent to a search or seizure.  
Nadler found research about personal space, noting that people begin to 
report discomfort when someone who approaches them stands about 
twenty-seven inches away, although the test was done with people posing 
as researchers.87  No research has been done regarding the proximity of 
police-to-person contacted.  In our case, the first officer testified he was 
arm’s distance from Mr. Thompson, arguably placing himself within the 
discomfort zone. 
In Illya Lichtenberg’s well-regarded study, the researcher interviewed 
drivers who were stopped by police for traffic violations and asked to 
consent to a search of their car.88  The data was stark.  Forty-eight out of the 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Nadler, supra note 14, at 175. 
 86. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2002) (finding that a police 
officer’s actions of boarding a bus and questioning passengers did not constitute a seizure of 
passengers by police). 
 87. See Nadler, supra note 14, at 191 (stating that studies of interpersonal distance 
have demonstrated that people feel increased pressure to comply with a request when the 
requester speaks to them from a close physical distance). 
 88. See Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority:  An 
Inquiry into the “Consensual” Police-Citizen Encounter 240 (1999) (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice); see generally Illya D. Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio:  The Effects of 
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forty-nine consenting drivers thought that the police would have searched 
them anyway.89  All but two drivers stated they were afraid of what would 
happen if they did not consent.90  This proves that the searches were 
involuntary under the Supreme Court test, because reasonable people felt 
compelled to submit to the request.  Only five people out of fifty-four 
people in the vehicles refused to consent to a search.91  Of these, two were 
in fact searched anyway and one was threatened with future retaliation.92  
Nadler argues that this study proves a difference of perspective between 
officer and motorist.93 Although the officers were not interviewed in the 
study, there was nothing to suggest that the police officers were unusually 
abusive, nor that they brandished their pistols or phrased their requests as 
orders.  All the Supreme Court indicators of a consensual search were 
present, and yet we know from the perspective of the motorists, they were 
“coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse,”94 
making it a nonconsensual search. 
Within the memorandum in support of Mr. Thompson’s motion to 
suppress, students also included David Kessler’s survey in which he polled 
pedestrians in Boston about their perception of police stops.95  This research 
was explicitly on point.  Harvard law students asked participants to take 
part in a survey where they answered six questions.96  The first question 
was: 
1. You are walking on the sidewalk. A police officer comes up to you 
and says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want 
to talk to the officer. 
                                                                                                                 
Robinette on the “Voluntary” Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOWARD L. J. 349, 
365 (2001) (arguing that the fear that mandatory use of warnings by police would undermine 
the use of consent searches is unfounded). 
 89. See Lichtenberg, supra note 88, at 267–75. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Nadler, supra note 14, at 169 (finding that a person’s perspective can make 
behavior appear voluntary to an outsider, when in actuality, the actor feels constrained by the 
situation). 
 94. Id. at 193. 
 95. See David K. Kessler, Free To Leave?  An Empirical Look at the Fourth 
Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 52 (2009) (discussing 
whether people feel free to terminate simple encounters with law enforcement officers). 
 96. See id. at 68 (explaining the questionnaires that were administered to several 
students at Harvard Law School). 
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On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk 
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.97 
The other questions also involved individuals projecting how they 
would feel in situations with police.98  Kessler reports that the majority of 
respondents would not feel free to leave a police officer who questioned 
them on a sidewalk or on a bus, nor would they feel “somewhat free to 
leave.”99  Only twenty percent reported they felt free to leave.100  However, 
although Kessler’s research is useful, it relies on people’s suppositions 
about how police might talk to them and does not capture the essence of 
most street interactions.  As Nadler recognized, people tend to 
underestimate the extent to which situational pressures will affect their 
behavior.101  Kessler agrees that “[t]he coercive pressures experienced when 
actually dealing with a police officer are likely to make one feel less free 
than when one is standing in a train station” conversing with a student 
researcher.102  Even so, Kessler’s study shows that the majority of people 
recognize that they will not feel free to walk away if police approach them. 
While there are some other social science studies that relate to the 
consent doctrine, none are exactly on point.  Slobogin and Schumacher 
created a study where volunteers rated the intrusiveness of various police 
behaviors.103  The results indicated a disconnect between society’s actual 
expectations of privacy and the Court’s assumptions about how police 
activities affect expectations of privacy.  While most of the study had little 
to do with consent or the free-to-leave doctrine, people rated the 
intrusiveness of police boarding a bus and asking to search luggage.  
Contradicting the Court’s assumptions in Bostick and Drayton, responders 
rated this as much more intrusive than the specter of police rummaging 
through drawers at an office, although the bus interrogations are not 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 88. 
 98. See id. (noting the thoroughness of the test). 
 99. Id. at 75. 
 100. See id. (suggesting that the average respondent did not feel somewhat free to 
leave). 
 101. See Nadler, supra note 14, at 155, 168-72 (detailing how people tend to discount 
the amount of coercion created by situations, a form of observer bias). 
 102. Kessler, supra note 95, at 80. 
 103. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:  An Empirical Look at 
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L. J. 727, 733–42 (1993); 
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law 
Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 198–99 (1993). 
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covered by the Fourth Amendment while the latter is.104  The study is an 
example of the increasing use of social science as a means of critiquing the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings.  Like other social science critiques of 
the Fourth Amendment, Slobogin and Schumacher sought change at the 
Supreme Court level, although they recognized the Court is likely to simply 
ignore the data.105 
One researcher who focused on Fourth Amendment consent was 
Dorothy Kagehiro, but she focused on third party consent situations.106  One 
hypothesis that was borne out in the data was that the person consenting 
had a different understanding of her own ability to choose or control the 
situation than did an observer to the situation.  Judges, as observers, are 
more likely to “overestimate consenters perceived choice in permitting 
police entry,” Kagehiro cautioned.107  In addition, Kagehiro proved that the 
manner in which questions were asked altered whether volunteers felt they 
had a choice in refusing consent.108  However, the nuances used in the study 
are beyond the capacity of a court to use in ruling on a motion to suppress 
evidence.  For example, Kagehiro tests different responses to a police 
officer saying “Would you mind if I came in to look around,” to one saying 
“I would appreciate it if I could come in and look around.”109  While this 
information would be useful for training police officers in techniques that 
maximize cooperation, courts cannot be expected to make distinctions such 
as this.110  At hearings, judges must generally rely on police self-serving 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Slobogin & Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness, supra note 103, at 189 
(presenting respondents’ results to inquiries about intrusiveness of searches); see also 
Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy, supra note 
103, at 774 (1993) (noting “The results of this research should also remind judges that 
because of their distance from the world of police investigation and the effect of hindsight 
bias, they may tend to underestimate the intrusiveness of police actions.”). 
 105. See id. at 198–99 (concluding that most of the Supreme Court’s rulings on search 
and seizure are based on flawed assumptions about society’s perspective on privacy and 
autonomy). 
 106. See Kagehiro, supra note 84, at 41 (applying psychological theory and research on 
attributions, interpersonal relationships, and human territorial functioning to issues and 
assumptions in the law of warrantless searches and seizures). 
 107. See Slobogin, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 103, at 188–92 (hypothesizing 
that consent influenced by coercion could be mistakenly perceived as voluntary willingness); 
see also Kagehiro, supra note 84, at 39 (“The perspective of a court during a suppression 
hearing . . . is that of an observer.”). 
 108. See Slobogin, supra note 103, at 189 (discussing how police can use coercive 
phrasing to obtain perceived consent). 
 109. Kagehiro, supra note 84, at 41 (describing vignettes used to demonstrate how 
different phrasing would influence consent).  
 110. See id. at 46 (suggesting that the courts may inaccurately interpret the defendant’s 
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recitations of events that occurred months ago.111  Street interactions are 
never recorded, and as there are generally no unbiased witnesses, there is no 
method to confirm the accuracy of police memory other than the testimony 
of the defendants themselves. Moreover, drawing such fine linguistic 
distinctions in laboratory experiments invites the Court to continue to make 
fine distinctions in the case law, such as determining that people are free to 
leave if the officer is polite or uses a conversational tone of voice—
distinctions that have been extensively critiqued by Nadler and other 
commentators.112  Criticizing the Supreme Court’s blind adherence to the 
structure of police language seeking permission to search, Nadler notes that 
context is more important than phrasing, “because contextual factors can 
affect meaning in limitless, even if systematic, ways, there is no sense to be 
made—either scientific or folk—of claims about the ‘literal meaning’ of 
some linguistic sequence.  Its meaning can change with identity of speaker, 
tone and accent, location of the utterance (church, courthouse), and a host 
of other indexes.”113 
Studies of attitudes towards the police may also be relevant to 
determining what a reasonable person’s response would be to police 
conduct.  In an important study in Chicago, researchers found that 
“observing others being treated with disrespect was the strongest predictor 
of trust in the police.”114  “In general, the public experiences police-initiated 
contacts as negative experiences (e.g., arrests, vehicular stops, field 
interrogations) that lead to dissatisfaction with law enforcement and other 
unfavorable opinions of police officers.”115  In interviews with a large 
                                                                                                                 
consent as voluntary without considering the full psychological context). 
 111. See, e.g., Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause:  A Case for Judging Police by a 
More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L 259, 272 (2010) (citing Myron W. Orfield, 
Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:  An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics 
Officers, 54 U. CHI L. REV 1016, 1024–25 (1987) (“According to Orfield, virtually all of the 
officers admit that the police commit perjury, if infrequently, at suppression hearings.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 112. Nadler, supra note 14, at 155 (discussing how politeness could create socially-
induced pressure); see also Raymond, supra note 9, at 1492 (stating that courts assume that 
people have the confidence to easily decline consent to searches).  
 113. Nadler & Trout, supra note 2, at 11. 
 114. Jamie L. Flexon, et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in the Police Among 
Chicago Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180, 186 (2009) (explaining that observing police 
mistreatment of others strongly predicts level of trust in police (citing D. D. Jones-Brown, 
The Myth of Officer Friendly:  How African American Males Experience Community 
Policing, 16  J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 209−29 (2000)). 
 115. Id. at 182 (citing M. Sced, PUBLIC SATISFACTION WITH POLICE CONTACT - PART 1:  
POLICE INITIATED CONTACTS, ADEL.:  AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR POLICING RES. (2004)). 
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sample of high school students, researchers found that nearly sixty percent 
of students interviewed “reported having been stopped by the police in the 
last year, and forty percent reported that they observed others stopped and 
treated with disrespect by the police.  Only eleven percent reported that 
they witnessed others stopped and treated with respect by the police.”116  
This data undermines the Court’s hypothetical reasonable person test 
because the precedent assumes a certain level of trust.  Not only does the 
Court assume that the police will not punish those who try to leave in 
determining whether there has been a consensual encounter, but the Court 
also assumes that individuals trust the police will not punish them for 
asserting this right.  The data proves the assumption of trust is unfounded. 
In sum, there is a scarcity of social science research on what a 
“reasonable person” would do in situations such as these.  While Kessler’s 
study regarding people’s perceptions of their freedom to terminate 
interactions with police is the most on point, it suffers from the very 
problem that affects judges’ decision-making, namely, a tendency for 
observers to overestimate choice.  Ideally, further studies should be 
undertaken that simulate the situation actually faced on the street. 
IV.  Can Social Science Change A Legal Fiction? 
Advocates for the use of social science in Fourth Amendment 
decision-making have focused almost exclusively on the Supreme Court.117  
Tracey Meares and Bernard Harcourt argue that empirical evidence is 
particularly useful when the Supreme Court justices engage in a balancing 
test that weighs liberty interests against society’s interest in law 
enforcement.118  Meares and Harcourt ask:  “Do we really believe that the 
unadorned commonsense judgments of the justices of the Supreme Court 
are adequate to determine the scope of individual rights . . . if there is social 
science research available to inform the Court’s commonsense 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 185 (discussing statistics of those stopped by police in a Chicago study); see 
also Wesley G. Skogan, Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police, 16 POLICING & 
SOC’Y 99, 99–126 (2006) (introducing the background of the Chicago study).  
 117. See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword:  Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 742–43 (2002) (including various academic discussions on why the 
Supreme Court should apply social science research); see also Slobogin & Schumacher, 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, supra note 103 at 774–75. 
 118. See id. at 742 (suggesting that it would be a good idea for the Supreme Court to 
use social scientific studies to gauge the social consequences of its decisions). 
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judgments?”119  In the Fourth Amendment context, they criticized the Court 
for deciding that “headlong flight” from police officers constitutes proof of 
criminal wrong-doing without reference to empirical evidence, such as 
available data gathered during stops in New York City.120  Their criticism 
could be equally aimed at the Mendenhall, Delgado, and Drayton decisions, 
for the three majority opinions contain no empirical evidence to support the 
Justices’ conclusions that reasonable people in the same situation as those 
individuals would have felt free to leave or to tell the police to leave them 
alone. 
I imagine that certain critiques will be leveled against the call for 
empirical evidence at the trial court level.  First, skeptics might argue that 
this really is a matter of Supreme Court decision-making.  According to this 
view, lower courts are bound to apply the legal fiction regardless of the 
persuasiveness of empirical evidence contradicting the Supreme Court’s 
conclusions.  Since misdemeanor cases will never make it to the Supreme 
Court, efforts should be redirected away from trial memoranda towards 
amicus briefs.  Second, others might argue that the Supreme Court will not 
be persuaded by social science since the free-to-leave doctrine as applied by 
the Court is a legal fiction designed to empower the police and dilute the 
Fourth Amendment.  Both of these critiques will be addressed below.  
Other criticisms that relate to social science generally are beyond the scope 
of this article. However critiques about the paucity of studies are welcome, 
especially if accompanied by an interest in creating new data. 
Turning to the first potential criticism, that the free-to-leave test is a 
matter of Supreme Court decision-making and not a lower court matter, it is 
indeed improbable that a misdemeanor trial will be appealed all the way to 
the Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, these trial court briefs have merit.  There 
is increasing criticism directed at the Court’s failure to use social science 
when defining the contours of Fourth Amendment protection, despite 
fatalism that the current Supreme Court will disregard social science data in 
favor of its own commonsense judgments when balancing the privacy and 
dignity rights of individuals against society’s interest in fighting crime.121  
                                                                                                                 
 119. See id. at 784 (questioning whether common sense judgments alone are sufficient, 
or whether there needs to be more social science research to supplement them).  
 120. See id. at 750 (discussing the Court’s conclusion in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119 (2000), that flight from police meant evasion). 
 121. See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”:  Exploring the 
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 612 (1991) 
(describing Justice Brennan’s opinion that social science research does not coincide with the 
Court’s normative philosophy); see also Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy, supra note 103 (“The alternative most likely to be adopted, given the Court’s 
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Trial lawyers’ efforts to include social science in their memoranda should 
be understood as part of the growing condemnation of “the Court’s 
empirical myopia.”122  Moreover, although the Brandeis brief has become 
the preferred method of introducing social science into appellate decision-
making, the most celebrated opinion based on social science was the school 
desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education,123 where studies on 
children’s attitudes towards black dolls were initially introduced at the trial 
level.  Nevertheless, critics would be correct that the primary purpose in 
including the social science in the Memorandum Supporting Mr. 
Thompson’s Motion to Suppress was to convince the trial judge to grant the 
motion, not to change the law or to convince an appellate court. 
While proponents of social science data as a method for resolving 
constitutional law questions generally seek to influence the nine Supreme 
Court justices, there is no scholarship on the use of social science in 
motions to suppress to influence the trial judge.  Although primarily 
concerned with the ability of appellate justices to consider empirical studies 
in creating rules of law, Monahan and Walker wrote an article that 
envisioned a role for lower courts in shaping law, rather than ceding this 
work to the Supreme Court or judges on the highest state courts.124  A 
“lower court should be able to reach empirical conclusions that differ from 
those of an appellate court when it has obtained new research not 
previously before the reviewing court,” they argue.125  Monahan and 
Walker distinguish between social science research used to create the rule 
of law, and research used “to adjudicate an issue within a settled legal 
context.”126  The data we used in Mr. Thompson’s case to challenge the 
free-to-leave doctrine should be classified as research used to change or 
shape the rule of law.  Thus, in Mr. Thompson’s case, Monahan and Walker 
would recognize the trial court’s ability to consider these studies in 
deciding that the precedent was wrong, envisioning the judge’s role as a 
step in a gradual process of changing the rule of law. 
                                                                                                                 
past reaction to empirical research, is to reject or ignore the data.”). 
 122. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court’s projected view of the Constitution 
limits its application of other views). 
 123. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954) (noting Clark’s study). 
 124. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority:  Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 499–500 (1986) (discussing the 
importance of appellate review).  
 125. See id. at 516 (discussing how higher court opinions may deviate from the lower 
courts opinions on the basis of newfound research). 
 126. Id. at 491 (contrasting the different applications of social science research). 
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In fact, the distinction between rule of law and question of fact is not 
so clear.  After all, Supreme Court precedent does not declare that people 
approached on the street by police are never seized.  Rather the settled 
doctrine is that judges must look at all the circumstances to determine what 
a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would think.  In Mr. 
Thompson’s case, arguably, it is a question of applying this law to the 
particular facts adduced during the motion hearing.  The loose nature of the 
test vests great discretion with the trial judge who is in the best position to 
recognize subtleties that might change the dynamic between officer and 
citizen.  Understanding human nature can help a court apply the facts.  
Knowing how most people behave and think in similar situations can help a 
judge determine what is reasonable.  Thus, social science may be useful in 
an individual application of the reasonable person test as well as the 
creation of the rule of law. 
Turning next to the criticism that social science cannot defeat a legal 
fiction, this poses a novel question regardless of whether the decision-
maker is the trial judge or the Supreme Court.  At the trial court level, since 
judges probably view the free-to-leave test as a fiction, how people actually 
behave might be beside the point.  It may seem obvious that Ms. 
Mendenhall would never voluntarily consent to a strip search,127 that Mr. 
Drayton would have terminated the encounter with police if he could, and 
that Mr. Delgado would never stay to answer questions about his 
immigration status had they not each felt compelled to do so.  On the other 
hand, judges might truly seek to apply the free-to-leave test.  Judges might 
agree with Erik Luna that the alternative to incorporating societal standards 
is relying on each judge’s “own naked preferences.”128 
Similarly, if the Supreme Court created the legal fiction in order to 
empower the police and dilute the Fourth Amendment, then social science 
data that proves the obvious would be unlikely to sway the Court.  The 
Supreme Court has a complicated relationship with social science, as David 
Faigman documented.129  Often the Court decides facts without any 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 549. 
 128. See Erik Luna, Privacy, Policing Homosexuality, and Enforcing Social Norms, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 846–47 (2008) (discussing the preferences of the Supreme Court 
justices); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimat[e] 
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either 
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”). 
 129. See Faigman, supra note 121, at 566–600 (discussing several Supreme Court cases 
in which social science played a role). 
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research or data.130  When data contradict the Court’s factual assumptions, 
the Court “might simply sweep the research aside as invalid or shift to an 
alternative basis for its holding, thereby rendering the research 
irrelevant.”131  Yet, while it may seem unlikely for the Supreme Court to 
throw out the current free-to-leave doctrine based on proof of how people 
actually behave, such a switch is not unprecedented.132  The “separate but 
equal” doctrine was also a legal fiction, undone by psychological studies, or 
at least the Court attributed the changed rule in part to the empirical 
evidence presented.133 
Consider another Fourth Amendment doctrine that was recently 
transformed. In 2009, the Court radically altered the “search incident to 
arrest” doctrine when the majority refused to continue to perpetuate a 
fiction.  Arizona v Gant134 overturned New York v. Belton,135 jettisoning an 
oft-used exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Belton had allowed police to 
search a car without probable cause or a warrant whenever the police 
arrested the driver.136  The stated justification for Belton’s bright line rule 
allowing searches of vehicles following an arrest was that police needed 
protection from arrestees who could reach in and arm themselves or destroy 
evidence.137  It was clear immediately that this bright line rule would 
include men and women who had no actual ability to retrieve items from 
the car.138 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See id. at 581 (noting that the Court rules on the basis of its own bias when no data 
is available). 
 131. Id. at 589 (discussing how the Court can choose to ignore contradicting research); 
see Brief of Respondents at 36–43, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) 
(referencing empirical research in support of arguments made in the brief).  
 132. See id. at 565–66 (referencing Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade). 
 133. See id. at 566 (noting “[i]n retrospect, it seems clear that the studies were not 
necessary to the holding” in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1955)). 
 134. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (holding that police may search a 
vehicle incident to a recent arrest if that “arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or there is reasonable belief that there 
is evidence relating to the arrest in the vehicle”). 
 135. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–62 (1981) (concluding that police 
may search a vehicle without probable cause if the occupant is arrested). 
 136. See id. (same). 
 137. See id. at 461 (noting that contents in compartments that are within the reach of the 
occupant may pose a danger to the arresting officer). 
 138. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Under the approach taken today, the result 
would presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his 
companions in the patrol car before placing them under arrest.”); see also Thornton v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624–25 (2004) (holding that a police officer may search a 
vehicle incident to an arrest even if the arrestee is handcuffed and in the back of a police 
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For over two decades men and women were handcuffed before police 
searched the cars they had been driving.139  The Court even explicitly 
applied the exception to handcuffed suspects.140  Finally, in Gant, the Court 
refused to continue the fiction, valuing logic over precedent.141  Justice 
Stevens explained that the reason for the switch was that the stated 
justification did not comport with reality: 
The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that 
the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is 
unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger 
compartment are rarely ‘within the area into which an arrestee might 
reach,’ . . . and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty assumption would 
authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of stare decisis 
does not require us to approve routine constitutional violations.142 
As the dissent pointed out, reality had not changed; this was a legal 
fiction from the start: 
Abandonment of the Belton rule cannot be justified on the ground that 
the dangers surrounding the arrest of a vehicle occupant are different 
today than they were 28 years ago . . . surely it was well known in 1981 
that a person who is taken from a vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the 
back of a patrol car is unlikely to make it back into his own car to 
retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.143 
Even though the lack of reality was obvious at once, ultimately it was 
attention to this reality that undermined the doctrine.  As Colin Miller 
wrote, “Gant’s deconstruction of the Belton fiction was based upon Justice 
Scalia’s Thornton concurrence, which found that the problem with the 
Belton fiction was that the government could cite no examples in which an 
arrestee had escaped and retrieved a weapon or evidence from his vehicle 
‘despite being handcuffed and secured in the back of a squad car.’”144 
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 139. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628 (“Reported cases involving this precise factual 
scenario—a motorist handcuffed and secured in the back of a squad car when the search 
takes place—are legion.”). 
 140. Id. at 625 (affirming the conviction while admitting that the possibility of a 
handcuffed arrestee getting hold of a weapon, or something that would put the officer in 
danger, is remote). 
 141. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 359–60 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(observing that a defendant who is handcuffed cannot reach the contents of his vehicle). 
 142. Id. at 351 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 143. Id. at 360 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 144. Colin Miller, Stranger Than Dictum:  Why Arizona v. Gant Compels the 
Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests are 
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If a standard as firmly entrenched as search incident to arrest can be 
“interred” based on reality, then Mendenhall and Drayton can also be 
interred by social science.145  Social science might lead the Court to reason 
that “we now know that” people on inner city streets who are stopped and 
questioned are not free to leave and would not feel free to leave; and, “blind 
adherence to [Mendenhall’s] faulty assumption would authorize myriad 
unconstitutional searches.  The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us 
to approve routine constitutional violations.” 
V.  The Outcome in Mr. Thompson’s Motion to Suppress 
The students representing Mr. Thompson cited social science studies 
in their motion to suppress to support the argument that a reasonable person 
in his position would not feel free to leave when police quickly stopped 
their cruiser, exited, and came to stand directly in front of him and his 
friend.  Therefore, Mr. Thompson was seized as soon as police came up to 
talk to him.  The government did not respond at all to these social science 
studies. 
Did the social science help get around the case law in this case?  The 
answer is ambiguous, because the judge granted the motion to suppress 
based on other grounds.  While the social science supported the first 
argument, that Mr. Thompson was seized, the judge ruled against us on that 
issue.  Mr. Thompson fell victim to the legal fiction that he was free to walk 
away when the police stopped and questioned him.  Thus, even though the 
police stated that Mr. Thompson looked away from police, trying to avoid 
contact with them, the judge endorsed the fiction that he voluntarily 
relinquished his right to be left alone. 
On the other hand, the judge ruled that while the stop was consensual, 
the search itself violated the Fourth Amendment.  The judge simply did not 
credit the officer’s testimony that our client told him he had drugs in his 
pocket.  Hence, there was no probable cause to search.  While the officer 
had testified that he asked for consent to search, the judge did not credit the 
officer’s memory on that score either. 
In sum, the social science did not convince the judge to evaluate the 
free-to-leave test from Mr. Thompson’s perspective.  Still, it is unusual to 
win a motion to suppress.  In addition, I feel certain that the judge read our 
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J., dissenting). 
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motion.  Quite possibly, the social science data shifted the way the judge 
viewed the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress. 
VI.  Conclusion 
“When a citizen summons the police, police presence is a welcome 
relief.  But when officers approach uninvited, it is seldom a happy event 
for the citizen.”146 
Stops for “walking while black or brown” are as intrusive and 
intimidating as the better-known “driving while black” policing.  Each 
week, thousands of people are stopped and questioned as they walk on city 
streets.  They did not seek out the police any more than drivers stopped for 
traffic offenses voluntary consent to pull over.  This repeated invasion into 
privacy and dignity translates into a distrust of the police and a sense of not 
belonging to American society.147  Unlike drivers stopped for traffic 
offenses, police are free to target individuals for any reason whatsoever 
because the Fourth Amendment only governs stops, not consensual 
encounters.  When individuals stop and respond to the police, as Justice 
Alito declared in a 2011 case, they “have only themselves to blame” for 
choosing “not to stand on their constitutional rights.”148  The Court 
underestimates the intrusive and coercive nature of police investigations on 
targeted pedestrians, blaming the victim for acquiescing to police pressure. 
Although the government has the burden of proof during motions to 
suppress, the deck is stacked against pedestrians who acquiesce to police 
authority.  Social science might make a difference.  Although there is not 
necessarily a correlation between a court’s definition of the reasonable 
person and how most people actually behave or think, the courts at least 
provide lip service to this connection.  How most people feel when 
confronted by police is something that can be measured.  Defense attorneys 
should include social science as a way of convincing the trial court and if 
that fails, convincing an appellate court. 
This Article has shown that social science can defeat a legal fiction 
such as the consensual nature of street encounters.  There is precedent for 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversing legal fictions when reality proves the 
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precedent wrong.  Moreover, where the Supreme Court has created a 
reasonable person test based on totality of the circumstances, it is legitimate 
to ask a trial judge to take that test at face value and use statistics, 
psychology and sociology to demonstrate what reasonable people actually 
think when confronted by police officers and thereby defeat the 
government’s claim that the stop was not a stop, but merely a consensual 
encounter. 
  
